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FOREWORD
MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ*

This symposium explores the basic question of who should bear the burden of
paying attorney fees in litigation. It is a question with a variety of answers that
differ not only in their theoretical basis but also in the ways in which they are
applied. Under the "American rule," each party pays the fees of its own attorney.
Under the "English rule," the losing party bears the expense not only of its own
attorney but of the winning party's attorney as well. "One-way" shifts of attorney
fees exclusively favor either plaintiffs or defendants. Other systems adopt one or
another of these approaches but with significant modifications.
Those who read the articles in this symposium seeking an unequivocal answer
to the basic question will be disappointed. The pages that follow make clear that
the problems are very complex, that things are often not what they seem, and that
it is inordinately difficult if not impossible to develop a satisfactory general answer
to the question posed by attorney fee shifting. Nevertheless, the articles make a
substantial contribution to the consideration of the question. At least as significantly, they exemplify how scholars from a variety of disciplines can illuminate an
important social problem with insights from both the law and the social sciences.
Prior to the conference for which these articles were prepared, there seems to
have been very limited scholarly support for the American rule. The literature
assumed that the burden ofjustifying a rule that was applicable only in the United
States was too heavy to overcome.' The articles, however, make clear that the
American rule is entitled to more credit that its opponents have given it; they also
make clear that the English rule has its own severe limitations.
John Leubsdorf provides an original and very plausible explanation of the
origin of the American rule in the early nineteenth century (while posing a different historical puzzle). Leubsdorf's argument is that the earlier "English rule"
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applicable in the colonies resulted in the award of very low attorney fees to the
prevailing party, and that the American lawyer's response was to charge his own
client, so that the English rule fell into desuetude. 2 Werner Pfennigstorf's survey of
European law indicates that a pure form of the English rule is a rarity on the books
and that the term masks a wide variety of formulas. 3 Herbert Kritzer's on-thescene examination of actual practices in Ontario reveals that where the English
rule is on the books, other types of fee arrangements, supposedly banned, develop.
The use of contingent fee arrangements in Ontario is an example. Under this fee
arrangement the defendant effectively pays the fees of the plaintiff's lawyer if the
plaintiff wins; if the plaintiff loses, however, the plaintiff's attorney bears the cost
4
of his or her own legal services.
The functional arguments in favor of and against one rule are largely the
obverse of the arguments in favor of and against the other. 5 There is an argument
based on unfairness. The American rule assumes that, given the uncertainties of
litigation, it is unfair to penalize the loser with the payment of the winner's fees.
The English rule assumes that it is unfair to force one who wins a law suit to pay
for the needless expense occasioned by the loser's erroneous contest of the winner's
position. The winner should be made whole. There is also an argument based on
access to the legal system. The American rule does not discourage those with little
financial means from using the judicial system by saddling them with the winner's
fees if they lose. The English rule, on the other hand, although it has a "punitive"
potential for those who bring or defend "bad" legal positions, encourages those
with "good" legal positions to instigate law suits by recompensing their legal
expenses if they prevail. Finally, there is an argument based on judicial efficiency.
The American rule avoids the sometimes difficult and contentious determination
of the proper amount of attorney fees to be awarded the winner. In application,
though, the English rule handles this issue of amount of fees quite routinely.
Irrespective of the strengths of the arguments in favor of the English rule, there
is little prospect that the United States will adopt the English rule in whole,
although, as is made clear in a number of articles, particularly that of Frances
6
Zemans, the English rule is now in effect in this country to a limited extent.
Moreover, a move toward adoption of the English rule outright should be made
with great caution. Both Tom Rowe 7 and Braeutigam, Owen and Panzar 8 conclude that it is impossible to predict whether more or fewer claims would be made
under the English rule as opposed to the American rule. Indeed, the latter study
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also concludes that, although the American rule probably results in a lower total
expenditure per case than the English rule, it is not possible to say in general under
which rule a party will individually spend more or less. 9
What about a one-way shift? No scholars seriously advocate an asymmetrical
system favoring defendants. What then of a one-way system favoring all (or most)
plaintiffs? A one-way pro-plaintiff system would encourage at least three classes of
plaintiffs who may require this type of financial inducement to litigate their
claims: (1) those plaintiffs with legitimate but uncertain small-to-moderate claims
who are obligated to pay their lawyers out of their own resources; (2) those plaintiffs with very strong claims but whose attorney fees exceed or are a high percentage of the value of the claim, a group that includes individual members of a
plaintiff class, and persons bringing law suits in the public interest; and (3) those
plaintiffs who have nonmonetary claims such as suits for injunctions.°
A general shifting of attorney fees to all prevailing plaintiffs, however, might
also encourage some odd-sounding and questionable complaints and races to the
courthouse, and might include plaintiffs with no special claim to the benefit. For
example, Tom Rowe cautions us to recognize that a general pro-plaintiff fee shift
would impose heavy burdens on "medium-sized" defendants." He also persuasively points out that a one-way general fee shift will not necessarily increase the
rate of settlement. The reason is that the "aware" plaintiff, recognizing the
increased potential liability on the part of the defendant because of the possibility
of a fee shift, will increase the settlement demand. This in turn negates any added
12
pressure for the defendant to settle due to the prospect of paying attorney fees.
The effects of a fee-shifting incentive system upon litigants and upon their lawyers must be distinguished. First, unlike the client, a lawyer convinced that a case
is a loser is not likely to take it on a contingent fee basis merely because the fee will
be paid by the defendant should the case be won. Whether the lawyer receives no
fee from the client or from the defendant would not seem to make much difference
in the lawyer's behavior.
Second, there are serious professional problems inherent in the award of
attorney fees to the prevailing plaintiff, a point made clear by Alfred Conard in his
examination of shareholders' derivative suits 13 and by Charles Wolfram in his
detailed discussion of the lawyer-client conflict in the settlement of litigation when
the attorney fee is negotiated at the same time as the plaintiffs damages.' 4 One
other pervasive professional problem is discussed by Marshall Breger: how the
prevailing plaintiffs attorney fees should be calculated. 15 Breger reveals that the
calculation issue is more than a problem of arithmetic by his review of the under9. Id. at 180-82.
10. Rowe, supra note 7, at 147-48.
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lying theory of attorney fee awards and the ways in which that theory affects how
the awards are computed. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has
recently established certain benchmarks, 16 there is a good deal of litigation and
legislation on this issue yet to come.
Can there be a precise determination of which plaintiffs would or should not
receive the benefit of a one-way shift, or conversely, which defendants should or
should not bear the burden? To date, the determination appears to have been
made on an ad hoc basis, with recent legislative and judicial activity greatly
increasing the circumstances in which one-way shifts take place. There are over
130 federal statutes providing for attorney fee awards 17 and over 1900 state statutes providing for such awards. 8 How should the general categories of favored
plaintiffs or disfavored defendants be defined? Some possibilities follow:
policy (private attorney general or public interest) cases versus routine cases
rich versus not-so-rich parties
good faith versus bad faith claims or defenses
individuals versus corporations or government
large claims versus small claims
ad hoc statute by statute

The articles in the symposium pay the greatest attention to "public interest"
litigation. Robert Percival and Geoffrey Miller review the justifications for support of public interest litigation, and the need for the award of attorney fees to
support it.' 9 Bruce Fein is unsympathetic on political and structural grounds to
the general concept of public interest litigation. If such litigation is to be permitted or encouraged, he would limit attorney fee awards to a much smaller set of
cases than is true today. 20 Marshall Breger points in the same direction as Fein
with his suggestions for establishing the level of attorney fees to be awarded. 2 1
At bottom, the shifting of attorney fees is one aspect of the financing of legal
services. The legal services distribution system-of which the financing of legal
services is a fundamental part-has changed drastically in recent years and there is
no indication of a deceleration of the rate of change of that system. In the past
16. Blum v. Stenson, 104 S.Ct. 1541 (1984) (a "reasonable attorney's fee" under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is
to be calculated at prevailing market rates, whether the plaintiff is represented by private or nonprofit
counsel; upward adjustments to fees ("multipliers") that have been determined by hours actually worked
should not normally be made); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3274, 3276 & n.5 (1983) (to be
awarded attorney fees under § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7607(0(1976), and certain other
statutes, party must achieve some success on the merits); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940
(1983) (under Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), attorney fees awarded
only for work done on those counts that are successful); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 422 (1978) (under § 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), prevailing plaintiffs normally
awarded attorney fees; prevailing defendants only when plaintiffs' claims are "frivolous, unreasonable or
groundless").
17. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 103 S. Ct. 3275, 3276 (1983); see A-rr', FEE AWARDS REP., Feb. 1984,
at 2-3.
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twenty years we have seen (1) the expansion of the right to counsel in criminal
cases to misdemeanants sentenced to jail terms; (2) the beginnings of a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases; and (3) the geometric expansion of federally
funded legal services, including Federal Public Defenders and Civil Legal Services
Programs. An imperfectly regulated for-pay services system has been largely converted into a market mechanism with the breakdown of the restrictions on solicitation and advertising, growth of mass-merchandised legal services, group legal
services, and prepaid "legal-cost insurance." The public interest movement has
been born and has prospered.
The number and complexity of law-producing units-firms, corporate counsel,
government agencies-have expanded to degrees that would have been inconceivable forty years ago, and would not have readily been believed even twenty years
ago. The ratio of U.S. lawyers to the general population is close to double the
traditional 1 to 700 ratio, while the profile of the bar has significantly changed
from its previous all-white all-male image.
A social change that is harder to quantify than the demographic ones is the
widely perceived shift of popular attitude toward greater acceptance of the use of
the judicial process by average men and women-and children-to vindicate or
create legal rights. 22 We have always been a society preoccupied with law, and our
economic philosophy is rooted in theories of private enterprise. It is not surprising
that we consider the problem of judicial accessibility by asking who should pay for
litigation attorneys. In our dedication to sports terminology, it is not surprising
that we talk about the issue in terms of winners and losers.
What does all this signify? Herewith some speculation:
1. More pro-plaintiff fee shifting will mean an increase in the instigation of
litigation. Some plaintiffs whose attorney fees will be paid by the losing party will
be more inclined to go forward in certain kinds of cases. Whether there will be a
comparable increase in the rate of settlement cannot be predicted.
2. There will be greater scrutiny of lawyers' methods of charging fees and the
amounts sought, leading to greater regulation by courts and legislatures. Government agencies that are forced to pay the attorney fees of those who have triumphed against them will be more inclined to examine carefully the fee
statements of their opponents' attorneys and to challenge them. Further, there
may be downward pressure from the courts and legislatures on the amount of
attorney fees to be paid by losing public agencies. Consider, for example, the low
fee schedules in Veterans Administration cases, 23 and under the Criminal Justice
24
Act ($30 per hour for court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time).
Indeed, if the award of attorney fees turns out to produce a very low fee to the
prevailing party's attorney, lawyers may insist upon separate fee arrangements
22. But cf. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Dsputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C. L.A. L. REV. 4 (1983).
23. 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (1976)(maximum $10 fee for representation of veterans in certain administrative hearings before Veterans Administration).
24. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (1982). The Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(C)(z)(A) (West Supp. 1983) limits attorney fees to $75 per hour. See also Percival &
Miller, supra note 19, at 245; Breger, supra, note 21, at 264.
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with their clients. If that were to happen, we would be back to John Leubsdorf's
25
explanation of the genesis of the American rule.
3. There will be a clearer separation of lawyer from client. Evidence of that
phenomenon abounds. Lawyers are themselves charged for frivolous litigation
and delay. Legal Services offices and public interest attorneys are awarded
attorney fees according to a more general market rate rather than their own salaries, although in neither of these situations does the attorney fee award have much
to do with the actual attorney costs of the successful party. 26 Courts have become
increasingly concerned about the conflict between attorney and client in these situations leading to increased judicial intervention. 27 All in all, professional responsibility problems undoubtedly will receive a good deal more attention.
4. To the extent that attorney fees are more frequently awarded by courts or
legislatures in cases involving the "public interest," more lawyers will litigate "in
the public interest." There will then be a blurring of the line between the public
interest law firm that depends heavily upon awards of attorney fees as a source of
revenue 28 and other private attorneys who may depend partially upon such a
source of revenue. All plaintiffs' lawyers may claim to be public interest litigators.
The likely consequences of a shift to increased use of a one-way pro-plaintiff fee
rule also may be examined from several different perspectives:
The Pubic. There will be an important symbolic consequence to the public.
Courts will appear more accessible and less costly. This symbolism may, however,
run counter to the public's self-conception as taxpayer when the fee awards are
against governmental units.
Potential Litigants. How much will judicial accessibility in fact increase? We
know little about how much potential litigation lies awaiting the encouragement
of a one-way fee shifting rule. There are constraints, among them the significant
opportunity costs in litigation, the reluctance of lawyers to take very marginal
cases, and the counterattack in the form of a counterclaim that today would not be
brought because of the legal costs involved, but may be used to discourage the
plaintiff with a threat of net financial loss if the plaintiff's lawsuit is pressed.
If we assume that current patterns of lawyer use by individuals reflect current
litigable grievances-with the most egregious cases litigated-the prediction about
judicial accessibility may be made more accurate. With a one-way shift we should
have more of the same.
The patterns of lawyer use reflected by Legal Services, Lawyers Reference, and
more general surveys show that family matters lead the list; there are numerous
landlord-tenant and collections problems, but the individual is not usually the
plaintiff in these cases. It is possible that shifting the fee may change those patterns, but the amount of change is unclear. It is likely that there will be more
consumer litigation, the incidence of which will be determined largely by matters
such as opportunity costs, risk aversion, and whether the parties deal regularly
25.
26.
27.
28.
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with each other. How much nondamage-award litigation-suits for injunctions
and the like-will result is impossible to predict, although this sort of litigation
potentially presents a fruitful area for increased litigation volume.
Courts. Although it is impossible to predict the impact of fee shifting on the
rate of settlement, one can assume that the volume of litigation will increase,
applying even more pressure for judicial reform or for removal of certain types of
cases to alternative dispute-resolving mechanisms. Perhaps ironically, many of
these alternatives are structured to exclude lawyers.
Lawyers. It is important to emphasize that as litigious a nation as the United
States is, most lawyers' work is not litigation-connected. Fee shifting has been
limited, so far at least, to the litigation process and will not affect the bulk of
lawyers' work.
On the other hand, the impact of the demographic changes cannot be ignored.
We have the largest number of lawyers in our history. Our lawyer-population
ratio continues to increase. We are adding over 30,000 lawyers per year, with some
50% of the bar in practice about ten years or less. That means we have a very
large number of young lawyers.2 9 Although the large institutional firms seem to
continue to absorb significant numbers of graduates, only 20% of the lawyers in
private practice in the United States are in firms of over ten lawyers. Three percent of those in private practice are in law firms of 100 or more lawyers. Almost
two-thirds of the private bar practice in units of three lawyers or less, and almost
half are solo practitioners. 30 This is the segment of the bar most likely to be
adversely affected by the competition created by the greatly increased lawyer-population ratio. This is the group most likely to have excess hours, and to take on
marginal, low-value cases for plaintiffs who cannot pay reasonable attorney fees
even if they win. This group of lawyers will likely look to the shift of attorney fees
for their own economic salvation. Thus, a shift of attorney fees should, at least in
the short run, increase litigation and improve the economic welfare of one class of
lawyers.
Moreover, an increase in litigation necessarily increases the demand for defendants' lawyers. From the standpoint of the bar's self interest, the optimum arrangement is the one-way plaintiff fee shift, for that will increase litigation, which in
turn will require more lawyers for both sides.
The fact that fee shifting may be beneficial to the welfare of lawyers is not,
however, enough of a redeeming social value. It is essential that the social choice
of fee-shifting regimes proceed upon better theoretical and empirical understanding than has been the case in the past. Otherwise, we run the risk of being
overtaken by self-interest. It is equally essential that we more carefully consider
the problems of professional responsibility that fee-shifting regimes create. This
symposium is a significant step in that direction.
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